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CLOSING THE WAGE GAP: CITIES’ AND STATES’ 
PROHIBITIONS AGAINST PRIOR SALARY HISTORY 
INQUIRIES AND THE IMPLICATIONS MOVING FORWARD 
Timothy J. Nichols* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In an effort to eliminate wage discrimination on account of sex, 
Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA).1  The EPA amended 
Section 6 of the Fair Labor and Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), adding a new 
subsection.2  While this new subsection prohibits employers from paying 
workers of one sex different wages than workers of the other sex for equal 
work, the subsection also includes four enumerated exceptions.3  Despite 
efforts to eliminate wage discrimination based on gender, women earned 
eighty-three percent of what men earned in 2015 (granted, an increase from 
sixty-four percent in 1980).4  While this pay gap is based on many factors, 
such as (1) women being more likely to take breaks from careers to care for 
a family, and (2) women being overrepresented in lower-paying occupations, 
surveys reveal this gap may also be a result of gender discrimination.5 
The broadest and most controversial of the exceptions contained in the 
FLSA is a catch-all that permits disparities in pay between the genders 
“based on any other factor other than sex.”6  Prior salary history, the focus 
of this Comment, is a regularly relied-upon factor employers assert as a 
“factor other than sex” when facing claims of gender-based wage 
discrimination under the EPA and FLSA, as seen in the cases discussed 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; Dual B.A., University of 
Michigan-Ann Arbor. 
 1  Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56. 
 2  Id.  The Act created 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) that prohibits gender discrimination in wage 
payment practices.  Id. at 56–57. 
 3  29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2018). 
 4  Nikki Graf, Anna Brown & Eileen Patten, The Narrowing, but Persistent, Gender Gap 
in Pay, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 9, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/04/09/gender-pay-gap-facts/. 
 5  Id.  Women were twice as likely as men to feel discriminated at work because of 
gender (42% vs. 22%); also, 77% of women and 63% of men believe more changes must be 
implemented to achieve gender equality in the workplace.  Id. 
 6  29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). 
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below.7  Further adding to the controversy is the fact that the different circuit 
courts that have addressed the relationship between prior salary history and 
the “factor other than sex” exception have applied different standards in 
evaluating the claims.8  Two circuit courts have held that prior salary history 
cannot be the sole factor in justifying pay disparities between the genders.9  
Another circuit court allows reliance on prior salary history as the sole 
justification, but conducts an inquiry into the reasonableness and asserted 
reasons for the reliance.10  One circuit court accepts prior salary history as a 
“factor other than sex” unequivocally.11  Finally, one circuit court just 
recently eliminated prior salary history in its entirety from the catch-all 
“factor other than sex” language.12 
In an effort to continue closing the gender wage gap, multiple cities and 
states around the country have enacted legislation that prohibits employers 
from inquiring about applicants’ prior salary histories or requiring applicants 
to disclose such information.13  All of these laws have a general prohibition 
on employers seeking an applicant’s prior salary history but have certain 
unique provisions and range from more restrictive to less restrictive 
depending on the particular law.14  And although the push to institute these 
types of laws has intensified, these laws have been met with resistance.15 
This Comment argues that state and municipal legislatures, displeased 
with the ongoing wage discrepancy between the genders and the analyses 
and outcomes of the judiciary in cases alleging gender discrimination under 
the EPA, are enacting these new laws to remove the most controversial 
element of courts’ analysis.  Part II of this Comment provides an in-depth 
discussion of the EPA and the FLSA, along with the conflicting stances 
federal circuit courts have adopted regarding the interplay between prior 
salary history and one of the exceptions of the FLSA.  Part III discusses the 
laws currently enacted by cities and states across the United States as of this 
writing and compares and contrasts elements of the laws.  Part IV introduces 
some of the emerging backlash against the laws and the implications the laws 
 
 7  See infra Part II.B–D. 
 8  See id. 
 9  See Angove v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 70 F. App’x. 500, 508 (10th Cir. 2003); Irby 
v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 955 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 10  See Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710, 720 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 11  See Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 469 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 12  See Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 13  Dori Goldstein, More Laws Enacted to Ban Salary History Inquiries, BLOOMBERG 
BNA (Jul. 5, 2017), https://www.bna.com/delaware-oregon-enact-b73014453430/; F. 
Christopher Chrisbens, San Francisco Joins the Salary History Inquiry “Ban” Wagon, NAT’L 
L. REV. (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/san-francisco-joins-salary-
history-inquiry-ban-wagon.  
 14  See infra Part III. 
 15  See infra Part IV. 
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have across the country now and moving forward.  Part V argues that the 
cities and states enacting the laws are effectively circumventing one of the 
exceptions under the FLSA by removing prior salary in its entirety from 
consideration, eliminating the catch-all from the courts’ analysis.  Part VI 
suggests that, until prior salary history inquiry bans become universally 
enacted, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ approach is the correct approach to 
analyzing prior salary history as a “factor other than sex.”  Part VII briefly 
concludes. 
II. THE EQUAL PAY ACT, “FACTORS OTHER THAN SEX,” AND THE 
CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A. The Equal Pay Act 
As mentioned above, the EPA “prohibit[s] discrimination on account 
of sex in the payment of wages by employers engaged in commerce or in the 
production of goods for commerce.”16  The new subsection to FLSA added 
by the EPA states: 
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this 
section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such 
employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex 
by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less 
than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite 
sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance 
of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which 
are performed under similar working conditions.17 
The above text comes with a caveat, however, that a wage disparity 
ordinarily impermissible under the statute is otherwise permissible: “where 
such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; 
(iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; 
or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.”18  The “factor 
other than sex” exception is the broadest-worded exception among the 
enumerated exceptions, and the statute does not state a scope or any standard 
for determining which factors qualify as a “factor other than sex.”19  Some 
have argued prior salary history should be considered a “suspect factor”—a 
factor that, if courts allow employers to rely on it to permanently justify 
salary disparities, could perpetuate gender-based violations of the EPA.20 
 
 16  Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56, 56. 
 17  Id. at 56–57; 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1963). 
 18  Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56, 57 (emphasis added). 
 19  Jeanne M. Hamburg, Note, When Prior Pay Isn’t Equal Pay: A Proposed Standard 
for the Identification of “Factors Other Than Sex” Under the Equal Pay Act, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1085, 1087 (1989). 
 20  Id. at 1102. 
NICHOLS (DO NOT DELETE) 12/19/2018  2:18 PM 
414 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:411 
Courts have also indicated caution when dealing with prior salary 
history as a “factor other than sex.”21  The Ninth Circuit noted that prior 
salary history could be manipulated to provide a pretext for intentional 
gender discrimination, and an employer could take advantage of “unfairly 
low salaries historically paid to women” in order to perpetuate that 
discrimination.22  The Seventh Circuit recognized the concern that previous 
employers might have engaged in sex-based discrimination in wage 
practices, thereby resulting in lower wages for female employees when 
current employers rely on that tainted prior salary history.23  Despite this 
caution, courts accept that prior salary history may justify current pay 
disparities, but the courts are split on whether prior salary history satisfies 
the “factor other than sex” exception under the EPA.24 
B. The Circuit Split: Prior Salary History and an Additional Factor 
Some of the circuit courts adopted the viewpoint that prior salary 
history must be paired with an additional factor in order to qualify as a 
“factor other than sex” under the EPA.  In Irby v. Bittick, a female criminal 
investigator for a county sheriff’s department sued under the EPA when the 
department paid two new male additions to the team substantially more than 
she was paid.25  The defendants argued that the reliance on the prior salaries 
of the male employees in setting their current salaries qualified as a 
legitimate factor other than sex.26  The district court, however, rejected the 
argument, holding that “[p]rior salary alone is not a legitimate ‘factor other 
than sex.’”27  The court explained that if prior salary history was the sole 
justification, the exception would swallow the rule, perpetuating gender pay 
inequality.28  On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that it consistently 
adhered to the view that under the EPA a pay disparity between the genders 
cannot be justified by prior salary history alone, and therefore the court 
rejected reliance on prior salary history as a sole justification for the pay 
disparity.29 
While the court rejected a reliance on prior salary history by itself, it 
nonetheless held that a defendant can rely on prior salary history as a “factor 
 
 21  See Covington v. S. Ill. Univ., 816 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1987); Kouba v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 22  Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876. 
 23  Covington, 816 F.2d at 323. 
 24  See infra Part II.B–D; see also Hamburg, supra note 19, at 1085. 
 25  44 F.3d 949, 952–53 (11th Cir. 1995).  
 26  Id. at 955. 
 27  Irby v. Bittick, 830 F. Supp. 632, 636 (M.D. Ga. 1993).  
 28  Id. 
 29  Irby, 44 F.3d at 955 (citing Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th 
Cir. 1988)).  
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other than sex” when the defendant also relied on something else, such as 
experience.30  The court found “there is no prohibition on utilizing prior pay 
as part of a mixed-motive.”31  Since the defendants relied both on prior salary 
history and the experience of the two new male employees, the Eleventh 
Circuit was satisfied that the defendants properly relied on a “factor other 
than sex” under the EPA to justify a pay disparity.32 
In Angove v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., a fired male employee sued for, 
among other things, gender discrimination based on Williams-Sonoma 
paying him less than a female employee in the same position.33  The plaintiff 
suggested that Williams-Sonoma adhered to the “market factor” theory, 
whereby an employer justifies wage disparities based on the pay rates the 
two genders command in the marketplace.34  After rejecting this contention 
for lacking relevance, the court noted that the focus of the plaintiff’s 
argument was that Williams-Sonoma matched the female employee’s prior 
salary.35  The Tenth Circuit then stated that considering a new employee’s 
prior salary history is not prohibited under Section 206(d)(iv) of the EPA.36  
Instead, it is the employer’s sole reliance on prior salary to justify a pay 
disparity that is precluded by the EPA; and when an employer bases a new 
employee’s salary on prior salary history and something else like 
qualifications and experience, the employer has successfully invoked the 
“factor other than sex” defense.37  The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, by 
requiring an additional factor other than prior salary history for a “factor 
other than sex” defense, impose the strictest, most scrutinizing view of this 
exception under the EPA. 
C. The Circuit Split: Prior Salary History, Case-by-Case, and 
Reasonableness 
Another circuit court accepts the use of prior salary history as the sole 
factor in a “factor other than sex” defense, unlike the above-mentioned 
cases,38 but still conducts a factual analysis on a case-by-case basis or 
inquiries into the reasonableness of the reliance on prior salary history.  In 
Taylor v. White,39 a female United States Army employee sued her employer 
because her male colleagues performing the same work received higher 
 
 30  Id. 
 31  Id. 
 32  Id. at 957. 
 33  70 F. App’x 500, 504 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 34  Id. at 507. 
 35  Id. at 508. 
 36  Id. 
 37  Id. 
 38  See supra Part II.B. 
 39  321 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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pay.40  She contended that an employer should be prohibited from relying on 
prior salary history or a salary retention policy to avoid liability under the 
EPA because relying on said factors allows the perpetuation of wage 
inequalities.41  The Eighth Circuit, however, stated that nothing on the face 
of the EPA indicates any limitations to the catch-all “factor other than sex” 
defense, and the legislative history bolsters the view of a broad interpretation 
of this catch-all exception.42  While the court acknowledged that even though 
a salary retention policy could be used to perpetuate unequal wages based on 
past discrimination, this concern does not dictate adopting a per se rule 
finding all salary retention practices inherently discriminatory.43 
Rather than adopt a per se rule, the court instead recognized “the need 
to carefully examine the record in cases where prior salary or salary retention 
policies are asserted as defenses to claims of unequal pay.”44  The Eighth 
Circuit thought a case-by-case analysis into the reliance on prior salary 
history or salary retention policies with a discerning eye on the alleged 
gender-based practices would protect certain freedoms in business as 
Congress intended with the “factor other than sex” defense.45  What the 
Eighth Circuit did not endorse, however, is conducting a reasonableness 
inquiry into the employer’s actions or limiting the application of a salary 
retention policy to exigent circumstances only, as it would unnecessarily 
narrow the intent of the “factor other than sex” defense.46  While the Eighth 
Circuit states that prior salary history alone satisfies the “factor other than 
sex” factor under the EPA, the case-by-case factual analysis indicates this 
circuit will view reliance on prior salary history alone with some suspicion. 
D. The Circuit Split: Eliminating Prior Salary History in its Entirety 
The Ninth Circuit initially took a more narrow view than the Eighth 
Circuit, but still broader than the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, where a 
female public school employee sued the county after discovering it paid her 
less than her male colleagues.47  When the county moved for summary 
judgment, it acknowledged the pay disparity but based the discrepancy on a 
factor other than sex—prior salary history.48  The district court rejected this 
 
 40  Id. at 714. 
 41  Id. at 717. 
 42  Id. at 717–18.  “[T]he catch-all provision is necessary due to the impossibility of 
predicting and listing each and every exception.”  Id. at 718. 
 43  Id. at 718. 
 44  Id. 
 45  Taylor, 321 F.3d at 720. 
 46  Id. 
 47  Rizo v. Yovino, 854 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d, 869 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 
2017) (en banc). 
 48  Id. 
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defense and denied summary judgment, concluding that reliance exclusively 
on prior salary history is not a satisfactory “factor other than sex” defense.49 
Relying on precedent, the Ninth Circuit initially held that there is no 
strict prohibition against using prior salary history under the EPA, but it does 
not automatically qualify as a “factor other than sex” for purposes of the 
affirmative defense.50  Rather, prior salary history alone could satisfactorily 
justify a pay disparity only when “the factor ‘effectuate[s] some business 
policy’ and that the employer ‘use[s] the factor reasonably in light of the 
employer’s stated purpose as well as its other practices.’”51  When the 
plaintiff argued that relying on prior salary history alone would perpetuate 
existing pay disparities and therefore undermine the EPA’s intended goal, 
the court indicated that, in deciding the very same issue in Kouba v. Allstate 
Insurance Co., requiring the employer to show that using prior salary history 
effectuated some business policy and the factor was used reasonably would 
alleviate these concerns.52 
On rehearing en banc, however, the full Ninth Circuit eliminated prior 
salary history from the “factor other than sex” entirely.53  The court reasoned 
that to continue to allow employers to justify pay disparities with prior salary 
histories would contravene the text and history of the EPA and “vitiate the 
very purpose for which the Act stands.”54  Furthermore, if employers were 
able to take advantage of the “factor other than sex” catch-all with prior 
salary history, a sex-based salary disparity would be based on the very sex-
based salary differentials the EPA is supposed to eliminate.55  Ultimately, the 
Ninth Circuit narrowed the “factor other than sex” catch-all to legitimate, 
job-related factors56 and found that prior salary, alone or combined with 
other factors, is not job related and therefore does not qualify for the catch-
all defense.57 
The Ninth Circuit grounded its reasoning in several arguments.  First, 
looking at the historical context of the EPA, the court found that when the 
EPA was enacted, prior salary history would have definitely reflected 
previous gender discrimination in the marketplace.58  Further, Congress 
could not have intended to permit employers to rely on previous 
 
 49  Id. 
 50  Id. at 1165. 
 51  Id. (quoting Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876–77 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
 52  Id. at 1166 (citing Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876–78). 
 53  See Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018).  
 54  Id. at 456–57. 
 55  Id. at 457. 
 56  Such factors include “a prospective employee’s experience, educational background, 
ability, or prior job performance.”  Id. at 460. 
 57  Id.  
 58  Id. at 461.  
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discriminatory wages, thereby perpetuating the gender disparity.59  Second, 
relying on canons of statutory interpretation, the Ninth Circuit narrowed the 
“factor other than sex” catch-all to job-related factors.  The canon of noscitur 
a sociis, whereby a word’s meaning is understood by surrounding words, 
dictates that the specific exceptions in the EPA of seniority, merit, and 
productivity relating to job qualifications extend to the “factor other than 
sex” language, imposing a limitation to only legitimate, job-related 
reasons.60  Additionally, the canon of ejusdem generis, where general words 
are construed to be similar in nature to enumerated preceding specific words, 
supports this conclusion.61  Third and finally, the court took notice of the 
lobbying efforts of industry representatives who were concerned that 
legitimate, job-related factors in determining pay would not be covered 
under the other exceptions, and concluded that the catch-all was only added 
to assuage these concerns.62 
In finding that salary history cannot be used in setting current pay, the 
Ninth Circuit overruled Kouba, announcing that prior salary history is not 
job related and that continuing to allow employers to rely on such would 
perpetuate the gender-based discrimination the EPA was intended to 
expunge.63  The Ninth Circuit takes by far the most extreme view of prior 
salary history, railing against its use to perpetuate gender wage disparities 
and eliminating it from the “factor other than sex” analysis entirely. 
E. The Circuit Split: Deference to the Defense 
One circuit court, in the broadest interpretation of the “factor other than 
sex” defense under the EPA, accepts prior salary history as a factor other 
than sex without any qualifications or limitations.64  A female employee for 
the Department of Human Services in Illinois sued under the EPA, putting 
forward two arguments: (1) prior salary history must include an acceptable 
business reason; and (2) the use of prior salary history discriminates because 
all pay systems inherently discriminate based on sex.65  The Seventh Circuit 
noted how four appellate courts accept prior salary history as a “factor other 
than sex,” but only if the employer had an acceptable business reason.66  In 
looking to the actual statute, however, the court found that nothing in Section 
206(d) allows a court to set standards on what qualifies as an acceptable 
 
 59  Rizo, 887 F.3d at 461.  
 60  Id. at 461–62. 
 61  Id. at 462. 
 62  Id. at 463–64. 
 63  Id. at 468. 
 64  See Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 65  Id. at 468.  
 66  Id. 
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business practice, and that “the statute asks whether the employer has a 
reason other than sex—not whether it has a ‘good’ reason.”67  As long as 
employers avoid forbidden reliance on criteria like race or sex, employers 
may set their own standards for determining pay.68  The Seventh Circuit’s 
rule for prior salary history as a “factor other than sex” is reduced down to a 
single sentence: “[T]he employer may act for any reason, good or bad, that 
is not one of the prohibited criteria such as race, sex, age, or religion.”69 
There is one caveat, however, to the Seventh Circuit’s rule.  The court 
acknowledged that, in certain lines of employment, wage patterns could be 
discriminatory, but the court also noted how this must be proved and not 
assumed.70  Where an employee has been discriminated against in a prior job 
in violation of the EPA, relying on those wages to determine a new salary 
would perpetuate said discrimination in violation of the EPA.71  Absent 
evidence that plaintiff’s prior job engaged in wage discrimination in 
violation of the EPA, defendants’ reliance on that prior wage history was 
proper, and the court held the defendants were entitled to summary 
judgment.72  The Seventh Circuit, unlike all of the cases mentioned above, 
grants the most deference to an employer’s use of prior salary history as a 
“factor other than sex.” 
III. THE LAWS FROM VARYING CITIES AND STATES 
Given the varying approaches taken by the federal circuits regarding 
prior salary history as a “factor other than sex” under the EPA in conjunction 
with the fact that all circuits accept prior salary history as a factor to some 
degree,73 cities and states across the country have simplified the analysis by 
removing prior salary history as a factor altogether. 
A. The Massachusetts Law 
The Massachusetts law is intended to close the wage gap between the 
genders, with a focus on the phenomenon that lower wages and salaries of 
women follow them throughout their careers.74  The governor signed the bill 
into law on August 1, 2016, and took effect July 2018.75  It also bears 
 
 67  Id. 
 68  Id. at 468–69. 
 69  Id. at 469. 
 70  Wernsing, 427 F.3d at 470. 
 71  Id. 
 72  Id. 
 73  See supra Part II. 
 74  Stacy Cowley, Illegal in Massachusetts: Asking Your Salary in a Job Interview, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/03/business/dealbook/wage-gap-
massachusetts-law-salary-history.html. 
 75  Id. 
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mentioning that this new Massachusetts law includes a codification of 
Section 206(d) of the FLSA as amended by the EPA, but noticeably absent 
in the enumerated exceptions is the broad “factor other than sex” language 
of the EPA.76 
As an initial matter, the law prohibits an employer from seeking an 
applicant’s prior salary history from the applicant’s current or former 
employer.77  Once the employer has extended an employment offer, 
including compensation, to the applicant, however, said applicant can give 
written authorization to the employer to confirm prior salary history with 
prior employers.78  The Massachusetts law makes it unlawful for an 
employer to prohibit an employee from discussing either the employee’s 
own, or another employee’s, wages as a condition of employment.79  The 
employer also may not screen applicants by setting a minimum or maximum 
criteria that the applicant’s prior salary or compensation history must satisfy; 
nor may the employer condition being granted an interview or continued 
consideration for an offer of employment on the applicant’s disclosure of 
prior salary history.80  Lastly, the law forbids an employer from firing or 
otherwise retaliating against an employee because the employee: (1) resisted 
any action by the employer prohibited under this new law; (2) already did or 
is about to complain or institute a proceeding against the employer for 
violating any of the above-mentioned prohibitions; (3) testified or is about 
to testify or otherwise assist an investigation into violations of the law; or (4) 
revealed the employee’s own salary information or asked about another 
employee’s salary.81 
The Massachusetts law does grant a degree of reprieve with a safe 
harbor provision, however, for any employer charged with gender-based 
wage discrimination.82  It appears, however, that this safe harbor does not 
apply where the employer violates the prohibitions on seeking prior salary 
history.83  Provided the employer demonstrates that within the last three 
years the employer had performed a pay practice self-evaluation and has 
made reasonable progress towards eliminating gender-based pay 
differentials, the employer has an affirmative defense.84  The employer can 
design this self-evaluation, but the evaluation must be reasonable in detail 
 
 76  Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A(b) (2016), with Equal Pay Act of 1963, 
Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56, and 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2018). 
 77  § 105A(c)(2). 
 78  Id. 
 79  Id. § 105A(c)(1). 
 80  Id. § 105A(c)(2). 
 81  Id. § 105A(c)(3). 
 82  Id. § 105A(d). 
 83  See § 105A(d). 
 84  Id. 
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and scope relative to the employer’s size or consistent with the attorney 
general’s standard templates or forms.85  It is important to note that this safe 
harbor provision does not apply to an alleged violation of Massachusetts’s 
general gender-based wage discrimination law if the alleged violation 
occurred prior to the completion of the self-evaluation or six months 
thereafter.86  Simplified, Massachusetts’s law prohibits employers from 
conditioning employment on an applicant’s disclosure of prior salary history, 
seeking such salary history information without the consent of the applicant 
or prior to offering an employment opportunity with compensation, or 
retaliating against any employee or applicant that opposes such illegal 
practices.87 
B. The Philadelphia Law 
Philadelphia enacted its own prohibition against employers requiring 
applicants to disclose prior salary history, signed into law by the mayor on 
January 23, 2017, intended to be effective 120 days later on May 23, 2017.88  
In its findings, the Philadelphia City Council stated: (1) that the gender wage 
gap still exists in the United States; (2) that this gap has narrowed only by 
less than half a penny per year since 1963 when the EPA was passed; (3) 
basing a worker’s current wages or salary on prior salary history only 
perpetuates the gender wage disparity; and (4) salary offers should not be 
based on prior salary history.89 
In order to combat the above-mentioned issues, the Philadelphia law 
makes it unlawful for an employer to: (1) inquire into an applicant’s salary 
history; (2) require the applicant to disclose prior salary history; (3) condition 
employment or consideration for an interview or employment on the 
applicant disclosing such information; or (4) retaliate against an applicant 
for refusing to comply with or opposing such salary history inquiries.90  
These prohibitions mirror those of the Massachusetts law described above.91  
Unlike Massachusetts, however, Philadelphia imposes an additional 
restriction that states an employer cannot rely on salary history at any stage 
in the employment process, such as in negotiating or drafting a contract.92  
The employer may rely on such information provided that the applicant 
 
 85  Id. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. § 105A(c)(1)–(4). 
 88  Phila., Pa., Ordinance 160840, § 2 (Jan. 23, 2017).  
 89  PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-1131(1) (2017). 
 90  Id. § 9-1131(2)(a)(i). 
 91  See supra Part III.A. 
 92  § 9-1131(2)(a)(ii). 
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“knowingly and willing disclosed his or her wage history to the employer.”93  
None of these provisions apply to employers following state, federal or local 
law specifically permitting disclosure or verification of wage history for 
employment purposes, however.94  Absent from the Philadelphia law is a 
safe harbor provision as found in the Massachusetts law,95 and the 
Philadelphia statute does not include a provision permitting an employer to 
seek the applicant’s prior salary history after an offer of employment has 
been negotiated and extended to the applicant like in Massachusetts and 
Delaware.96 
The Philadelphia law imposes the same general prohibitions on an 
employer requiring an applicant to disclose prior salary history or 
conditioning consideration for employment on such disclosure, seeking such 
information from current or prior employers, and prohibiting retaliation 
against applicants who resist.97  Philadelphia goes further though, prohibiting 
an employer from relying on prior salary history unless the applicant reveals 
such information knowingly and willingly.98 
C. The New York City Law 
New York City enacted its prohibition against salary history inquiries 
when the mayor signed it on May 5, 2017, with the effective date being 
October 31, 2017.99  The law makes it unlawful for an employer to “inquire 
about the salary history of an applicant for employment.”100  “Inquire” means 
any type of question or statement to the applicant, the applicant’s current or 
prior employer, or a current or former agent or employee of such employer 
in any method for the applicant’s salary history.101  The inquiry definition 
also extends to searching publicly available records for such information.102 
Similar to Philadelphia, New York City also prohibits an employer 
from relying on prior salary history for determining salary, benefits, or other 
compensation to offer to an applicant at any stage of the hiring process.103  If 
an applicant, without prompting, voluntarily discloses prior salary history to 
 
 93  Id. 
 94  Id. § 9-1131(2)(b). 
 95  Compare id. § 9-1131, with MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 149, § 105A(d) (2016). 
 96  Compare § 9-1131, with supra Part III.A., and infra Part III.D. 
 97  § 9-1131(2)(a)(i)–(ii). 
 98  Id. § 9-1131(2)(a)(ii). 
 99  Brie Kluytenaar, Update on New York City Legislation Limiting Salary History 
Inquiries, NAT’L L. REV. (May 10, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/update-new-
york-city-legislation-limiting-salary-history-inquiries.  
 100  N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(25)(b)(1) (2017). 
 101  Id. § 8-107(25)(a). 
 102  Id. 
 103  Id. § 8-107(25)(b)(2). 
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an employer, its employee or agent, or an employment agent, the prospective 
employer is free to rely on such information.104  Furthermore, an employer 
may discuss with an applicant the applicant’s expectations as to salary, 
benefits, and other compensation, provided there is no inquiry into prior 
salary history.105 
Additionally, like Philadelphia, the law does not apply where federal, 
state, or local law requires disclosure of such salary history.106  The New 
York City law, however, also exempts internal transfers and promotions and 
public employee positions where salary is guided by collective bargaining 
procedures.107  Lastly, where an employer seeks to verify non-salary-related 
information or conduct a background check and discovers salary-related 
information, the employer has not violated the law but still may not rely on 
such information in determining an applicant’s offered salary.108 
New York City’s prohibition against salary history inquiries generally 
mirrors that of Philadelphia on what employer actions are prohibited, but 
also seems to provide more protections for employers, mainly in allowing 
discussions about salary expectations109 and shielding the employer for 
accidental salary history discoveries.110 
D. The Delaware Law 
When signing the salary history ban into law, Delaware Governor John 
Carney was quoted as saying: “‘[a]ll Delawareans should expect to be 
compensated equally for performing the same work . . . [t]his new law will 
help guarantee that across our state, and address a persistent wage gap 
between men and women.’”111  The law went into effect on December 14, 
2017.112  Like Massachusetts,113 Delaware prohibits an employer or an 
employer’s agent from screening applicants based on prior salary history, 
including requiring prior salary to satisfy either a minimum or maximum 
 
 104  Id. § 8-107(25)(d). 
 105  Id. § 8-107(25)(c). 
 106  § 8-107(25)(e)(1). 
 107  Id. § 8-107(25)(e)(2), (4).  “Collective bargaining” is defined as “[n]egotiations 
between an employer and the representatives of organized employees to determine the 
conditions of employment, such as wages, hours, discipline, and fringe benefits.”  Collective 
Bargaining, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th Pocket ed. 2016).  
 108  § 8-107(25)(e)(3). 
 109  Id. § 8-107 (25)(c). 
 110  Id. § 8-107(25)(e)(3). 
 111  Alex Vuocolo, Delaware First State to Enact Salary History Ban, DEL. BUS. TIMES 
(Jun. 15, 2017), http://www.delawarebusinesstimes.com/delaware-first-state-enact-salary-
history-ban/. 
 112  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709B (2017). 
 113  See supra Part III.A. 
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criteria.114  The employer also may not “[s]eek the compensation history of 
an applicant from the applicant or a current or former employer.”115  Similar 
to New York City,116 however, an employer may still discuss and negotiate 
expected compensation with the applicant, provided that there is no request 
or requirement for the applicant’s compensation history.117  Furthermore, 
similar to Massachusetts,118 an employer can seek an applicant’s salary 
history after an employment offer that includes compensation has been 
extended to the applicant; but differing from Massachusetts, this offer must 
also be accepted.119  This inquiry is solely for confirming the applicant’s 
prior salary history.120 
It is important to note that the Delaware law is certainly the barest, least 
descriptive of the laws enacting prohibitions on salary history inquiries 
described in this Comment.121  This could cause problems for employers, 
uncertain of what exactly is prohibited and what is allowed. Regardless, the 
Delaware law does what every other law described in this Comment does: 
prohibits employers from inquiring into the salary history of an applicant 
while granting an employer flexibility to make a competitive offer to that 
applicant.122 
E. The Oregon Law 
Oregon’s ban on seeking prior salary history went into effect in October 
2017; however, civil actions against employers who violate this law are not 
permitted until January 2024.123  Oregon, in its laws prohibiting salary 
history inquiries, also includes a codification of Section 206(d)(1) of the 
FLSA.124  Oregon’s codification includes a number of exceptions justifying 
pay disparities between employees of different genders, but, as seen in 
Massachusetts, the catch-all “factor other than sex” language has been 
removed.125  The absence of this catch-all language is telling—had 
 
 114  § 709B(b)(1). 
 115  Id. § 709B(b)(2). 
 116  See supra Part III.C. 
 117  § 709B(d). 
 118  See supra Part III.A. 
 119  § 709B(e). 
 120  Id. 
 121  Compare id. § 709(B), with MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 149, § 105A (2016), and PHILA., 
PA., CODE § 9-1131 (2017), and N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(25) (2017), and OR. 
REV. STAT. § 652.220 (2017), and S.F., CAL., MUN. CODE § 3300J (2017). 
 122  § 709(B). 
 123  Mark A. Crabtree & Claudia A. Halasz, Oregon Enacts Expansive Pay Equity Law, 
NAT’L L. REV. (Jun. 16, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/oregon-enacts-
expansive-pay-equity-law. 
 124  § 652.220(2). 
 125  Compare id., with § 105A(b), and Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 
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Massachusetts or Oregon desired the “factor other than sex” language, it 
would have been included. 
Turning to the enactments specific to salary history, Oregon has made 
it unlawful for an employer to “[s]creen job applicants based on current or 
past compensation.”126  While not explicitly stated, this condition certainly 
includes the minimum-maximum criteria element already seen in 
Massachusetts and Delaware.127  The law also forbids an employer from 
using current or past compensation as a factor in determining the 
compensation offered to a prospective employee.128  This prohibition, 
however, does not apply to an employer when a current employee is 
considered for a transfer, move, or hire to a new position with that same 
employer.129  Furthermore, under chapter 659A of the Oregon Revised 
Statute, an employer cannot seek an applicant’s prior salary history from the 
applicant or the applicant’s current or former employer.130  Once the 
employer has extended an employment offer that includes the amount of 
compensation, an employer can request written authorization from the 
applicant to confirm his or her prior salary history.131  This provision is in 
line with what Massachusetts and Delaware require.132 
Oregon, like Massachusetts, also offers a safe harbor provision in its 
law that alleviates an employer from liability under certain conditions; yet, 
unlike Massachusetts, this safe harbor appears to not apply to violations of 
the prohibition against salary history inquiry.133  The employer will be 
neither liable for compensatory nor for punitive damages if, within three 
years, the employer conducted a good-faith equal-pay analysis that was 
reasonable in detail and scope according to the size of the employer and 
related to the protected class in the suit.134  The wage disparity must also 
have been eliminated for the specific plaintiff, and the employer must have 
taken reasonable and substantial steps to eliminate the wage disparity for the 
protected class overall.135 
 
 
56., and 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1963). 
 126  § 652.220(1)(c). 
 127  See supra Parts III.A, D. 
 128  § 652.220(1)(d). 
 129  Id. 
 130  Id. § 659A; H.R. 2005, 79th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 4 (Or. 2017). 
 131  Id. 
 132  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A(c)(3) (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 
709(B)(b)(2) (2017); id. § 709(B)(e).  Note that Delaware also requires the offer to be 
accepted. 
 133  Compare Or. H.R. 2005 § 12, with § 105A(d). 
 134  § 12(1)(a)(A)–(B). 
 135  Id. § 12(b). 
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Oregon is prohibiting employers from screening applicants based on 
prior salary and using prior salary in determining how much to offer an 
applicant,136 as well as seeking this information from the applicant or the 
applicant’s current or former employer.137  But the employer also has a 
degree of leeway; an employer is allowed to confirm prior salary after 
extending a job offer which includes compensation,138 and the employer is 
protected by a safe harbor provision.139 
F. The San Francisco Law 
In almost identical language to the Philadelphia law, the San Francisco 
City Council found that: (1) women in San Francisco suffer from a gender 
wage gap; (2) the gender wage gap has narrowed less than half a penny per 
year since the 1963 enactment of the EPA; (3) seeking prior salary history 
contributes to the wage gap by perpetuating wage inequalities; (4) women 
are put at a disadvantage in negotiating salary when required to disclose prior 
salary history; (5) prior salary history is unlikely to not be a factor in 
negotiating or setting a salary offer when an employer is able to ask such 
information; (6) the new law will ensure that a woman’s prior wages will not 
weigh down her earnings throughout her career; and (7) the new law will 
ensure employees and employers negotiate salaries based on qualifications 
rather than prior salary history.140 
Turning to the law itself, an employer is prohibited from inquiring into 
an applicant’s prior salary history.141  In this context, “inquire” means any 
direct or indirect form of communication in any type of attempt to gather this 
information from or about the applicant.142  Further, an employer cannot 
consider an applicant’s prior salary history in determining what salary to 
offer, regardless of whether the applicant discloses the prior salary history 
voluntarily.143  This is a sharp deviation from the exceptions included in both 
the Philadelphia and New York City laws.144  Also, San Francisco, as 
displayed in previously discussed laws, prohibits an employer from refusing 
to hire or in any other way retaliating against an applicant for refusing to 
disclose prior salary history.145 
 
 136  OR. REV. STAT. § 652.220(1)(c)–(d) (2017). 
 137  Id. § 659A; Or. H.R. 2005 § 4. 
 138  Id. 
 139  Or. H.R. 2005 § 12. 
 140  S.F., CAL., MUN. CODE § 3300J.2(a)–(d), (l)–(m) (2017). 
 141  Id. § 3300J.4(a). 
 142  Id. § 3300J.3. 
 143  Id. § 3300J.4(b). 
 144  Compare id., with PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-1131(2)(a)(ii) (2017), and N.Y.C., N.Y., 
ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(25)(d) (2017). 
 145  § 3300J.4(c). 
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In another unique feature of the law, San Francisco also imposes 
liability on current and former employers—current or former employers 
cannot release the salary history of a current or former employee to said 
employee’s current or prospective employer without written authorization 
from the employee.146  Only San Francisco imposes such a restriction on 
current or previous employers.147  Lastly, an applicant can voluntarily 
disclose his or her prior salary history after an employer makes an initial 
salary offer to negotiate a different salary.148  Only then may an employer 
use such a disclosure as it strictly relates to making a counter-offer.149  While 
San Francisco imposes many of the provisions already enacted by other cities 
and states, it is certainly the strictest, most pro-employee of the laws in light 
of two key provisions: first, the provision that prohibits an employer from 
considering prior salary history after an applicant makes a voluntary 
disclosure, and second, the provision that imposes liability on an employer 
revealing the information, instead of just on the employer seeking the 
information. 
G. The California Law 
California introduced a bill intending to narrow the gender wage gap 
by prohibiting employers from asking about prior salary history.150  It was 
unclear whether it would be signed into law, however, as the Governor of 
California, Jerry Brown, had vetoed a bill implementing the same laws two 
years earlier after being pressured by business groups.151  At the time, the 
governor was quoted as saying that the law prevented employers “from 
obtaining relevant information with little evidence that this would assure 
more equitable wages.”152  The measure in 2015, however, had no G.O.P. 
support and received not one G.O.P. vote, whereas the more recent bill was 
co-authored by two Republicans and the bill garnered ten G.O.P. votes.153  
The 2017 bill did have opposition from powerful business groups, as the 
Chamber of Commerce gathered together an extensive coalition of 
detractors.154 
 
 146  Id. § 3300J.4(d). 
 147  See supra Parts III.A–E. 
 148  § 3300J.4(e). 
 149  Id. 
 150  Margot Roosevelt, Previous Salary? Soon, the Question Might Be Illegal in 
California, MERCURY NEWS (Sept. 11, 2017), http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/09/11/ 
previous-salary-soon-the-question-might-be-illegal/. 
 151  Id. 
 152  Id. 
 153  Id. 
 154  Id. 
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The Governor signed the bill into law on October 12, 2017.155  An 
employer is now prohibited from relying on an applicant’s salary history as 
a factor for deciding whether to offer the applicant a job or how much to 
pay.156  The employer also may not seek such salary history information—
whether it be oral or in writing—in person or through an agent, of an 
applicant.157  An applicant may voluntarily disclose his or her salary history 
information, and once an applicant does so, an employer is free to consider 
and rely on that information for determining an applicant’s offered salary.158  
These prohibitions will not apply to any salary history information that is 
disclosable according to state or federal law,159 but are enforceable against 
“all employers, including state and local government employers and the 
Legislature.”160  The bill went into effect on January 1, 2018.161 
IV. THE BACKLASH, IMPLICATIONS, AND OUTLOOK IN THE WAKE OF 
THESE LAWS 
A. The Legal Backlash 
These laws have faced backlash, however, including the Philadelphia 
ordinance that is now being challenged in court; the Chamber of Commerce 
of Greater Philadelphia162 has brought suit to strike down the ordinance.163  
Experts believe this suit “may set the tone for future litigation over pay-
history laws elsewhere.”164 
 
 
 155  Margot Roosevelt, California Bosses Can No Longer Ask You About Your Previous 
Salary, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Oct. 13, 2017), http://www.ocregister.com/2017/10/12/in-
bid-to-fight-gender-pay-gap-gov-jerry-brown-signs-salary-privacy-law/. 
 156  CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3(a) (West 2017) (amended 2018). 
 157  Id. § 432.3(b). 
 158  Id. § 432.3(g)–(h). 
 159  Id. § 432.3(e). 
 160  Id. § 432.3(f). 
 161  David Lazarus, From Weed to Wages, the New Year Ushers in New Laws Affecting 
Consumers, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2018, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/lazarus/la 
-fi-lazarus-new-california-laws-20180102-story.html.  
 162  A chamber of commerce is an association of businesses for a geographic area that 
seeks to further the collective interests of the group. What Is a Chamber, ASS’N OF CHAMBER 
OF COMM. EXECUTIVES, https://secure.acce.org/whatisachamber/? (last visited Dec. 17, 2018).  
Business owners voluntarily form these associations in order to advocate for economic growth 
and business interests.  Id. 




ba00ef0c.   
 164  Id. 
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In its complaint, the Chamber stated that rather than achieve gender 
wage equality, the law “will chill the protected speech of employers and 
immeasurably complicate their task of making informed hiring decisions.”165  
The Chamber, in its main argument, asserted that the ordinance violates 
employers’ First Amendment rights to free speech because it is both over- 
and under-inclusive,166 and that the ordinance violates both the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause.167  As to 
the First Amendment, the Chamber alleges that the ordinance imposes both 
content-based and speaker-based restrictions on employers’ speech because 
employers, and only employers, are prohibited from asking about prior 
salary history.168  Also, prohibiting employers from seeking such information 
is a content-based restriction on employers’ speech, which can only 
withstand strict scrutiny when the restriction serves a compelling state 
interest.169  The Chamber alleges the law serves no compelling interest 
because while Philadelphia has a compelling interest in eliminating pay 
disparities based on gender discrimination, that interest does not extend to 
wage differences based on factors such as skill or training, which the 
Chamber believes the new law covers.170  The complaint further alleges that 
the ordinance violates the Due Process Clause because the ordinance is 
impermissibly vague by failing to define key terms;171 and it violates the 
Commerce Clause because the law extends to any employer that either 
employs at least one employee or transacts business in Philadelphia, even if 
that employer is in another state.172  Based on these allegations, the Chamber 
has requested preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent Philadelphia 
from enforcing the ordinance.173 
After receiving the Chamber’s complaint, on April 19, 2017, the judge 
stayed the effective date of the ordinance pending the outcome of the 
Chamber’s motion for a preliminary injunction.174  In order to avoid 
confusion, the city agreed to the stay for employers and employees as the 
 
 165  Complaint at 2, Chamber of Commerce for Greater Phila. v. City of Phila., No. 17-
1548 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2017). 
 166  Id. at 4–5. 
 167  Id. at 5–6. 
 168  Id. at 13. 
 169  Id. at 14. 
 170  Id. at 15. 
 171  Complaint at 17, Chamber of Commerce for Greater Phila. v. City of Phila., No. 17-
1548 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2017). 
 172  Id. at 19–20. 
 173  Id. at 27.  
 174  Michael Tanenbaum, Philly Salary History Bill Put on Hold Amid Legal Challenge, 
PHILLYVOICE (Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.phillyvoice.com/philly-wage-equity-bill-put-hold-
amid-legal-challenge/. The effective date of the ordinance was May 23, 2017.  Id. 
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legal process moved forward.175  On May 30, 2017, however, Judge Mitchell 
S. Goldberg, presiding over this litigation, found that the Chamber of 
Commerce failed to demonstrate with specific facts that one or more of its 
members will be directly affected by Philadelphia’s ordinance so as to 
establish standing.176  Without such facts, the court cannot determine 
whether any of the individual members would have standing to bring suit; 
because the Chamber could not show that at least one of its members would 
have standing to sue, the Chamber itself does not have standing to sue, and 
the judge granted the City’s motion to dismiss.177  The matter was dismissed, 
however, without prejudice, and the Chamber was granted leave to amend 
its complaint within fourteen days of the order.178 
On June 13, 2017, the Chamber filed its amended complaint, alleging 
the same constitutional violations as before; however, this time the amended 
complaint included an extensive outline of the ways that the ordinance will 
harm certain particular enumerated members as exemplars for the group as 
a whole.179  Philadelphia did not file a motion to dismiss the amended 
complaint, so this lawsuit will be decided on the merits.180 
On April 30, 2018, the district court ruled on the Chamber’s motion for 
a preliminary injunction.181  The court bifurcated its decision, analyzing the 
ordinance in two parts: the “Inquiry Provision” that prohibits an employer 
from asking about prior salary history and the “Reliance Provision” that 
prohibits an employer from relying on prior salary history in setting current 
salary.182  In determining the Chamber’s likelihood of success on the merits 
of its constitutional challenge, the district court ruled that, since an inquiry 
into prior salary history occurs in the context of a job negotiation, the Inquiry 
Provision regulates commercial speech.183  Finding a law regulates 
commercial speech is critical because commercial speech receives less 
protection from regulation and laws regulating such speech are analyzed 
 
 175  Id. 
 176  Order, Chamber of Commerce for Greater Phila. v. City of City of Phila., No. 17-1548 
(E.D. Pa. May 30, 2017) (granting the City’s motion to dismiss). 
 177  Id. at 9–10. 
 178  Id. at 10. 
 179  Amended Complaint at 14–22, Chamber of Commerce for Greater Phila. v. City of 
Phila., No. 17-1548 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2017). 
 180  Stephanie J. Peet & Timothy M. McCarthy, Philadelphia’s Wage-History Ordinance 
Faces First Amendment Challenge, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. (Jul. 21, 2017), 
https://wlflegalpulse.com/2017/07/21/philadelphias-wage-history-ordinance-faces-first-
amendment-challenge/. 
 181  See Chamber of Commerce for Greater Phila. v. City of Phila., 319 F. Supp. 3d 773 
(E.D. Pa. 2018). 
 182  See id. at 782. 
 183  Id. at 783–84. 
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under an intermediate scrutiny standard.184  The intermediate scrutiny test for 
commercial speech is as follows: is the regulated speech unlawful or 
misleading?185  If not, the next question is whether the government’s asserted 
interest is substantial.186  If yes, the court asks whether the regulation directly 
advances the government’s asserted interest and whether the regulation is as 
least extensive as necessary to serve that interest.187 
As to the case at bar, the district court found that inquiring into prior 
salary history is not unlawful nor is it misleading, and as such the Inquiry 
Provision does not regulate unlawful or misleading speech.188  Both parties 
agreed that the City had a substantial interest in promoting wage equality and 
reducing the prevalence of discriminatory wage disparities.189  Analyzing 
whether the ordinance directly advances the City’s asserted interest, the 
district court noted that the Supreme Court emphasized that this prong could 
not be satisfied with mere speculation or conjecture, but must show that the 
harms sought to be avoided are real and the regulation will reduce them to a 
material degree.190  The district court concluded there was insufficient 
evidence establishing discriminatory wages being perpetuated in subsequent 
wages contributing to a discriminatory wage gap.191  Lacking such evidence, 
the court found that it was “impossible” to ascertain whether the Inquiry 
Provision would directly advance the City’s substantial interest of reducing 
discriminatory wage disparities and achieving wage equality.192  As a result, 
the court ruled that the Inquiry Provision violated the First Amendment such 
that the Chamber was likely to succeed on the merits as to its constitutional 
challenge to the Inquiry Provision.193 
For the Reliance Provision, however, the district court held that relying 
on salary history to set new salaries does not involve speech and therefore 
the Chamber could not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits that 
the Reliance Provision violates the First Amendment.194  Furthermore, the 
court found that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague nor was the 
scope of the ordinance beyond the territory of Philadelphia such that the 
ordinance would violate the United States or Pennsylvania Constitutions.195 
 
 184  See id. at 784. 
 185  Id. at 785. 
 186  Id. 
 187  Chamber of Commerce, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 785. 
 188  Id. at 787. 
 189  Id. 
 190  Id. at 793. 
 191  Id. at 800. 
 192  Id. 
 193  Chamber of Commerce, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 800. 
 194  Id. at 804. 
 195  Id. at 805–06. 
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As to the remaining prongs of the preliminary injunction test, the court 
found the Chamber could not show irreparable harm from the Reliance 
Provision because it would not be able to show that the Reliance Provision 
was unconstitutional.196  Since the Chamber showed a real and actual 
deprivation of First Amendment rights under the Inquiry Provision, however, 
the Chamber demonstrated irreparable harm from the Inquiry Provision.197  
The City of Philadelphia could not show irreparable harm because it could 
not “claim a legitimate interest in enforcing an unconstitutional law” and 
upholding freedoms under the First Amendment outweighed any harm the 
City may experience under the preliminary injunction.198  Lastly, since a 
great weight of precedent exists stating that “there is a significant public 
interest in upholding First Amendment principles,” the district court found 
that granting the preliminary injunction was in the public interest.199 
Based on the above analysis, the district court concluded that the 
Inquiry Provision violated the First Amendment and granted the Chamber’s 
preliminary injunction but the Reliance Provision did not violate the First 
Amendment and therefore would remain intact.200  This decision, however, 
effectively renders the Reliance Provision useless because if an employer 
can ask about prior salary history, it will be near impossible for an applicant 
to prove that the employer secretly relied on that information in setting the 
current salary.  Both parties appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit.201  Being a case of first impression, the final 
result of this lawsuit could resonate throughout the country with other state 
and city legislatures enacting, or considering enacting, other similar salary-
history bans.202 
B. The Legislative Pushback 
1. The Illinois Veto 
Rather than enact legislation similar to the ones seen above,203 the 
Governor of Illinois vetoed a bill that would prohibit employers from asking 
about an applicant’s prior salary history.204  The Governor stated his support 
 
 196  Id. at 806. 
 197  Id. at 807. 
 198  Id. 
 199  Chamber of Commerce, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 808. 
 200  Id. at 812. 
 201  Amanda E. Steinke, Constitutionality of Philadelphia’s Salary History Ban Appealed 
to Third Circuit, NAT’L L. REV. (June 12, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/ 
constitutionality-philadelphia-s-salary-history-ban-appealed-to-third-circuit. 
 202  Peet & McCarthy, supra note 180. 
 203  See supra Part III. 
 204  Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, Rauner Vetoes Bill That Would Bar Employers from Asking 
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for eliminating the gender wage gap, but suggested a bill more closely 
modeled after the Massachusetts law that would provide employers with 
more leeway.205  The Illinois bill did not include the caveat, as found in the 
Massachusetts bill, that an employer could seek prior salary history after 
offering a candidate the job with a salary.206  There was disappointment in 
the Governor vetoing the bill, but the indication that the Governor recognizes 
the existence of a gender wage gap and that a prohibition on asking about 
prior salary history could eliminate it is encouraging to supporters of the 
bill.207 
Instead of re-working the bill, those in favor of the bill planned to 
override the Governor’s veto legislatively in the November veto session.208  
The initial bill passed in the House by a vote of 91-24 and passed in the 
Senate by a vote of 35-18 (with one member voting “present”).209  The 
override requires seventy-one votes in the House and thirty-six votes in the 
Senate, and a Republican representative expressed his optimistic belief that 
the override effort will be successful due to the bill’s strong bi-partisan 
support.210  On November 9, 2017, however, when the Illinois Senate 
attempted to override Governor Rauner’s veto, it failed to do so.211  The 
Illinois House had successfully overridden the veto 80-33, but the Illinois 
Senate vote, needing three-fifths of members (thirty-six members) to vote in 
favor of the override, only garnered twenty-nine “yeas,” seventeen “nays,” 
and one “present.”212  At this point, it is unclear what will happen in Illinois 
regarding a prohibition against salary history inquiries, but the attempt to 
enact such legislation signals the growing desire for such prohibitions. 
2. The New Jersey Veto 
In the summer of 2017, the New Jersey Legislature put forward an 
amendment to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) that 
would have enacted similar salary history bans as seen above.213  The law 
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would have prohibited employers from: (1) inquiring about an applicant’s 
compensation and benefit history at any point during the hiring process; (2) 
screening a candidate based on his or her prior salary or benefits history; (3) 
using that prior salary history to make pay determinations; and (4) retaliating 
against an employee who shared terms and conditions of employment, like 
compensation, with other current or former employees.214  A candidate could 
volunteer prior salary history, at which point the employer could verify the 
information, provided that there was no employer coercion and the candidate 
gave written authorization for the inquiry.215 
Chris Christie, then-Governor of New Jersey, vetoed this bill on July 
25, 2017 because he felt that the law would punish inquiries made without 
discriminatory intent or impact in contradiction to the NJLAD.216  Governor 
Christie indicated receptiveness to consider a bill that would protect against 
wage discrimination without being hostile to business.217  There was an 
expectation that once Governor Christie was out of office in early 2018, the 
legislature would again introduce the same or a similar bill.218  Phil Murphy, 
a Democrat, defeated Republican Kim Guadagno in the New Jersey 
gubernatorial election and took office January 16, 2018.219  Governor 
Murphy has pledged to sign pay-equity legislation into law, nearly assuring 
that New Jersey will have new pay-equity laws, although the specifics of 
such legislation are not known.220 
3. The Michigan Preemption 
On March 26, 2018, the governor of Michigan, Rick Snyder, signed 
into law a bill that prohibits local governments and municipalities from 





 214  Id. 
 215  Id. 
 216  Id. 
 217  Id. 
 218  Sean D. Dias, New Jersey Employers Get Reprieve from Salary History Ban, SCARINCI 
HOLLENBECK (Aug. 17, 2017), https://scarincihollenbeck.com/law-firm-insights/labor-
employment/salary-history-bill-vetoed/. 
 219  Brent Johnson & Susan K. Livio, Next Up for Phil Murphy: His Transition to Power. 
Here’s How It Works, NJ.COM (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/1 
1/next_up_for_murphy_his_transition_to_power_heres_h.html. 
 220  Suzanne Herrmann Brock, Elizabeth Cowit & Brittany E. Grierson, The Push for Pay 
Equity Legislation in New Jersey, N.J. L.J. (Dec. 4, 2017, 12:16 PM), 
https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/sites/njlawjournal/2017/12/04/the-push-for-pay-equity-
legislation-in-new-jersey/. 
 221  Stacey A. Bastone & K. Joy Chin, A Ban on Salary History Bans: Michigan Bars 
Local Governments from Prohibiting Such Inquiries, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 29, 2018), 
NICHOLS (DO NOT DELETE) 12/19/2018  2:18 PM 
2019] COMMENT 435 
amended a law from 2015 prohibiting local governments from banning 
salary history inquiries entirely.222  The law is seen as a clear measure to 
block cities and municipalities from banning salary history inquiries, despite 
the fact that at the time of signing, no municipality had proposed such an 
ordinance.223 
C. What’s on the Horizon? 
New York City Public Advocate Letitia James expects a legal challenge 
from business groups like what occurred in Philadelphia.224  James expects 
litigation because of the pushback the New York City law received from 
trade associations like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.225  She was quoted 
as saying, “‘I suspect that someone will probably file a lawsuit,’” adding, 
“‘[w]henever you make any change and move the needle forward, it’s 
inevitable that some individuals will push back.’”226  As of writing, there is 
no indication that any suit has been filed challenging the New York City 
law.227 
D. A National Ban on Prior Salary History Inquiries 
On May 11, 2017, Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Democrat 
from the District of Columbia, introduced a bill to amend the FLSA to 
prohibit certain practices by employers regarding prior salary history, cited 
as the “Pay Equity for All Act of 2017.”228  This Act would introduce a new 
section, Section 8, to the FLSA making it unlawful for an employer to: (1) 
screen prospective employees based on prior salary history in such ways as 
(a) requiring that prior salary meet a minimum or maximum criteria, (b) 
requesting or requiring prior salary history as a condition of being 
interviewed, or (c) conditioning continued consideration for an offer of 
employment on the disclosure of prior salary history;229 (2) seek an 
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applicant;230 and (3) fire or retaliate against a current or prospective 
employee for: (a) opposing any of the practices made unlawful above, (b) 
nearing the process of making a complaint against the employer for 
violations of this act, or (c) testifying or is about to testify, assist, or 
participate in an investigation relating to the prohibited conduct.231  Since 
being referred to the House Committee on Education and the Workforce on 
the same day as the bill was introduced, there has been no further action on 
the Pay Equity for All Act of 2017.232 
V. ACHIEVING THE EPA’S GOALS AND CHANGING THE COURTS’ 
ANALYSIS 
In enacting these laws, either the laws themselves or the lawmakers 
signing them have hinted at one of the reasons for the enactment of such 
measures: the EPA has failed to accomplish what it set out to do.  The 
Philadelphia law acknowledges the dismal lack of narrowing in the gender 
wage gap since the passage of the EPA and that relying on prior salary 
history perpetuates wage inequalities.233  Bill de Blasio, Mayor of New York 
City, was quoted saying, “‘[i]t is unacceptable that we’re still fighting for 
equal pay for equal work.  The simple fact is that women and people of color 
are frequently paid less for the same work as their white, male 
counterparts.”234  He followed with, “[t]his Administration has taken bold 
steps to combat the forces of inequality that hold people back, and this bill 
builds upon the progress we have made to close the pay gap and ensure 
everyone is treated with the respect they deserve.”235  The Mayor of 
Delaware echoed a similar sentiment as Mayor Bill de Blasio when signing 
the Delaware law into legislation.236  As previously mentioned, noticeably 
absent from Oregon’s law outlining the bona fide reasons for a pay disparity 
is the vague language of “factor other than sex,” in addition to banning prior 
salary history.237  This suggests an awareness that employers have been 
utilizing the prior salary history and “factors other than sex” at large to 
perpetuate gender wage discrimination.  The San Francisco law stated the 
same findings as Philadelphia, hinting at a failure of the EPA and how 
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reliance on prior salary history perpetuates gender wage inequality, 
including findings related to Rizo regarding how relying solely on salary 
history would be in opposition to the goals of Congress in enacting the 
EPA.238  Governor Jerry Brown of California even described the “simple 
question” of prior salary as being a “barrier to equal pay.”239  Explicitly or 
implicitly, lawmakers are accelerating the goals of the EPA’s prohibitions 
against salary history inquiries, no longer acquiescing to the tortoise-like 
pace of historical progress. 
Furthermore, it is incredibly difficult to determine whether an 
employer’s reliance on prior salary history is genuine or a pretext for taking 
advantage of discriminatory wage practice, or even if the applicant’s prior 
salary was based on sexual discrimination.240  Although circuit courts 
acknowledge the potential for employers exploiting prior salary history as a 
“factor other than sex,” the circuit courts continue to uphold its use as an 
affirmative defense, albeit without any uniformity to its application.241  
Another clear, yet unspoken, goal of these state and municipal legislatures is 
to eliminate prior salary history as a “factor other than sex” in its entirety so 
as to remove it from a court’s consideration when hearing a sex-based wage 
discrimination claim.  While a “factor other than sex” defense is still 
available, prior salary history will no longer serve as an easily identifiable 
card for employers to play in the states and cities where the laws have been 
enacted. 
Businesses will certainly lose one key factor used in the hiring process, 
making offering and negotiating a salary more difficult, especially to high-
ranking executives.242  Proponents of the law, however, recognize this will 
lead to more hiring decisions based on merit.243  Businesses still have 
education, experience, recommendations, references, aptitude tests, etc. to 
determine if a candidate is a proper fit for the job.  Moreover, most of these 
laws do not fully eliminate the ability of an employer from asking about prior 
salary history or negotiating once a candidate has voluntarily disclosed such 
salary history.244  Eliminating prior salary history as a “factor other than sex” 
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greatly increases the chances of further closing the wage gap and protecting 
women from wage discrimination while leaving businesses no worse off than 
before. 
VI. RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT WHILE THE LEGISLATURES ACT 
Even while federal, state, and municipal legislatures push to enact their 
own versions of a salary-history inquiry prohibition, those states and towns 
without such legislation will be bound to the analysis of the circuit court of 
the circuit in which they are located.  As such, the differing analyses should 
be evaluated and resolved.  The reasoning of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, 
that prior salary history alone cannot be the sole justification as a “factor 
other than sex,”245 is flawed because nothing in the EPA or FLSA suggests 
this standard.  The list of exceptions that the EPA added to the FLSA are 
separated with an “or” and in the “factor other than sex” language, “factor” 
is singular.246  This construction suggests that an employer need only show 
one of the enumerated exceptions, and within the catch-all provision, need 
only show one factor other than sex.  By insisting that employers show prior 
salary history and an additional factor, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits are 
imposing a higher burden on employers facing EPA and FLSA wage-
discrimination challenges. 
Further, the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, that prior salary history 
is a valid “factor other than sex” unless there is a showing that the prior salary 
was the result of gender discrimination,247 while more reasonable, is too 
lenient.  This approach does not conduct an inquiry into the current 
employer’s potential invidious behavior, and determining whether the prior 
employer engaged in gender-based wage discrimination is a daunting task 
for employees asserting a violation of the FLSA.  The approach taken by the 
Seventh Circuit, affording employers more discretion than the Tenth and 
Eleventh Circuits, affords employers too much discretion. 
Additionally, the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit is too extreme. 
By eliminating prior salary history from the analysis entirely,248 the court has 
taken a potentially legitimate, innocuous factor from an employer’s 
determination on pay.  While the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the relationship 
between prior salary history and other legitimate, job-related factors was too 
attenuated to permit reliance on prior salary history,249 prior salary history 
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could very well reflect how a previous employer views the quality and worth 
of an employee’s work.  The Ninth Circuit may be correct in finding that the 
“factor other than sex” defense is limited to legitimate, job-related factors, 
but it was wrong to take such a broad step in ruling that prior salary history 
was not such a factor. 
This leaves the last approach taken by a circuit court as the best 
approach when resolving a plaintiff’s gender-based wage discrimination 
claim—that taken by the Eighth Circuit.  That circuit conducts a 
reasonableness inquiry into the employer’s use of prior salary history as a 
“factor other than sex” or ask whether a reliance on prior salary history 
effectuates a business policy.250  This analysis is squarely in the middle of 
the approaches mentioned above, imposing less of a burden than the Tenth 
and Eleventh Circuits do, but affording employers less discretion than the 
Seventh Circuit does.  The approach of the Eighth Circuit keeps both parties’ 
interests in mind, suspicious of an employer’s reliance on prior salary 
history, but willing to accept the idea that an employer innocently uses prior 
salary history as a legitimate factor in determining an employee’s pay.  So, 
until prior salary history prohibitions are enacted throughout the country, 
district courts and circuit courts should adopt the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning 
in evaluating claims arising under the FLSA involving prior salary history. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted the EPA with the intention of eliminating gender-
based wage discrimination.  To protect employers, however, this Act listed 
exceptions, one of which is a “factor other than sex.”  Numerous circuit 
courts acknowledge that prior salary history is a “factor other than sex,” 
varying by how much weight the courts give to that factor alone, despite the 
recognition that prior salary history can be exploited and abused to continue 
gender-based wage discrimination.  Unsatisfied with the current pace of 
progress regarding equal pay, and unwilling to let this matter play out in the 
judiciary, multiple legislatures around the country have enacted legislations 
prohibiting inquiries into prior salary history.  By their own words, 
lawmakers appreciate that the EPA alone is not getting the job done and 
recognize inquiries into prior salary history stand as an obstacle to full pay 
equality for equal work.  This march of progress is moving rapidly and will 
not stop until prior salary history is eliminated as a “factor other than sex” in 
its entirety across the country.  As a result, employers will no longer be 
allowed to disguise gender-based pay discrimination as an innocent reliance 
on prior salary history. 
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